• Manipulability in school choice (with M. Van der Linden) Journal of Economic Theory (forthcoming)
  • Too young to die. Deprivation measures combining poverty and premature mortality (with J.M. Baland and G. Cassan) American Economic Journal: Applied Economics (forthcoming)
  • Lives and livelihoods : Estimates of the global mortality and poverty effects of the Covid-19 pandemic (with M. F. Ferreira, D. Mahler and O. Steck) World Development (forthcoming)
  • Death and destitution : the global distribution of the welfare losses from the Covid-19 pandemic (with M. F. Ferreira, D. Mahler and O. Steck) LSE Public Policy Review (2021)
  • A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism. Social Choice and Welfare (2021)
  • Combining absolute and relative poverty : income poverty measurement with two poverty lines. Social Choice and Welfare (2021)
  • Purification and disambiguation of Ellsberg equilibria
    (with Frank Riedel) Economic Theory Forthcoming
  • Why not consider that being absolutely poor is worse than being only relatively poor? Journal of Public Economics (2017) 152, 79-92
  • Fair Social Orderings with Other-regarding Preferences (with Martin Van der Linden) Social Choice and Welfare (2016) 46-655


Income poverty has been halved in the developing world, even when accounting for relative poverty. (with Mery Ferrando) R&R at World Bank Economic Review

The first Millennium Development Goal was to halve extreme absolute poverty over the period 1990-2015. This goal has been met by a large margin, but the simultaneous increase in within-country inequality has led to an increase in relative poverty. As absolute and relative poverty evolved in opposite directions, whether or not overall poverty – which combines both absolute and relative poverty – has been reduced depends on the arbitrary priority assigned to absolutely poor individuals. We show that, if we assume that an individual who is absolutely poor is more poor than an individual who is only relatively poor, overall poverty in the developing world has been halved over the period, regardless of the value chosen for the priority parameter. This result is robust to alternative specifications of the poverty lines and to the exclusion of China or India.

In search of advice for participants in constrained school choice
(with Martin Van der Linden)

School choice mechanisms are typically constrained, with students allowed to report preferences on a limited number of schools only. Under constraints, even the deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) is manipulable and it is unclear how students should play. We provide advice by characterizing undominated strategies for the constrained versions of both DA and the Boston mechanism (BOS). We show that domination alone excludes more strategies in constrained DA than in constrained BOS. We also characterize “safe” and “maximin” strategies that risk- averse students might favor. These strategies achieve higher welfare and are more often available in constrained DA than in constrained BOS.

A new measure of income poverty for Europe
(with Tim Goedemé and Karel Van den Bosch) R&R at Journal of European Social Policy

In Europe poverty is usually measured with the at-risk-of-poverty indicator which defines the poverty threshold as 60 per cent of national median income. With this indicator, poverty seems to be lower in some ‘poor’ EU countries than in some of the richest EU Member States. Also, when the median income changes quickly, the evolution of poverty as shown by the indicator can be counterintuitive, for instance resulting in stagnation or even a decrease in poverty when median incomes fall and living conditions of the poor deteriorate. In this article we propose a new poverty indicator, the Poverty Gap Ratio with priority to the pan-European poor (PGR-PAN) which is not subject to these limitations. On the basis of EU-SILC data we show that our indicator results in results that are in better agreement with intuitive notions about poverty within the EU and captures more adequately changes as well as cross-national differences in living standards.

A criterion to compare mechanisms when solutions are not unique, with applications to constrained school choice
(with Francois Woitrin) R&R at Social Choice and Welfare

We introduce a new criterion to compare the properties of mechanisms when the solution concept used induces multiple solutions. Our criterion generalizes previous approaches in the literature. We use our criterion to compare the stability of constrained versions of the Boston (BOS) and deferred acceptance (DA) school choice mechanisms in which students can only rank a subset of the schools they could potentially access. When students play a Nash equilibrium, we show that there is a stability cost to increasing the number of schools students can rank in DA. On the other hand, when students only play undominated strategies, increasing the number of schools students can rank increases stability. We find similar results for BOS. We also compare BOS and DA. Whatever the number of schools students can rank, we find that BOS is more stable than DA in Nash equilibrium, but less stable in undominated strategies.



Fair and welfare-consistent global income poverty measures: theory and application (with Mery Ferrando and Natalie Quinn)

Fair inheritance taxation (with François Maniquet)